Introduction
It is an unsettled question how to conceive of a growing polity called the European Union (EU) in legal terms. Now the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereafter the Constitutional Treaty) has been signed and put forward for ratification by the twenty-five Member States, it is essential to ask how this Treaty normatively constructs the EU polity, and also inquire whether the Constitutional Treaty is the only constitutional norm on which the EU polity is to be established.
Broadly speaking, four types of approach have appeared in the debate over the normative conception of the EC/EU polity so far (Table 1 ).
On the current (i. e. pre-Constitutional Treaty) EC / EU, some have emphasized the ultimate significance of state sovereignty, and have classified the EC/EU essentially as an international organization of a remarkably effective kind (e. g., Hartley 1999 , 2001 , Denza 2002 . They particularly stress the Member States' competence to establish, change and even abolish the EC/EU by concluding treaties. In their view, the legal competence of the current EC / EU derives from the delegation of state sovereign power to the EC / EU by the Member States : the Member States would retain their sovereign power under the EC/EU regime, but for certain enumerated aims of the EC / EU, they would refrain from exercising their power in a way that might frustrate the aims and 22 Others have argued that the EC/EU, especially the EC, has established an autonomous and independent legal order which is distinct from those in the Member States in ever wider policy areas, now overlapping many regulatory functions of the nation-state, though the EC / EU's coercive force and public spending power may not be as fully effective and strong as the Member States'. Those who stress this autonomous and relatively effective EC/EU power to govern would conceive of the EC/EU either as an emerging federal state (Mancini 2000: 51) or as a non-state polity of an original kind (sui generis) (Weiler 1998 (Weiler , 1999 . Given these various approaches to the legal analysis of the current EC/ EU polity, it is interesting to examine whether the new Constitutional Treaty can settle the debate. In order to consider this, the present paper starts from the understanding that the Constitutional Treaty succeeds the basic framework and legal accomplishments ("acquis communautaire ") of the current EC/EU, although it adds some new features and modifies and /or clarifies some aspects of the current arrangements. Thus I will dispense with describing those points of continuation and refinements that Here, however, we need to look more into the substance than the formal terminology of the Constitutional Treaty, because already at present the EU governance overlaps many critical policy areas of the states of Europe, and EU law does directly create or alter citizens' legal rights and duties and their expectations.
Furthermore, since the term "Constitution" has been more frequently used to represent the basic rules of a "state" from the seventeenth century onwards (van Caenegem 1995) Thus, in terms of structure, the EU has now increased its unity. This is particularly the case for those matters for which the EU has exclusive or shared competences. According to the Constitutional Treaty, even in the field of the CFSP, which is neither the exclusive nor the shared competence of the Union, the Member States' unanimous decision at the European Council will be implemented by European Decisions, which bind the Member States as Union law, hence shall have primacy over the law of the Member States. This, at least in legal terms, will enhance the unity and effectiveness of the implementation of Union measures in the CFSP.
At present unanimous decisions named "common strategies", "common positions" and "joint actions" in this field are being implemented by each Member State's measures separately but collectively on behalf of the Union. Thus those national measures are subject to national and international legal order rather than the Union legal order. Compared to the current legal situation, the Constitutional Treaty incorporates the implementation aspect into Union legal order, which has more effective judicial supervision over and coercive force on the Member States.
Secondly, the Constitutional Treaty provides legal norms that promote the autonomous legislative power of the EU more than the present EC/ EU Treaties do. Interestingly, the Constitutional Treaty now provides the possibility of this reversion in the areas of "shared" competence (Art. I -12 (2)).
Whether this is a re-statement of current law or amendment to it is a moot point, but my point here is that the Constitutional Treaty clearly introduces federal distribution of legislative competence between the EU and the Member States. It does not use the controversial word "federal", but euphemistically says that the Union shall exercise its competences "on a Community basis" (Art. 1-1(1)).
A related larger point is that the Constitutional Treaty autonomously (3)).
Currently the Commission needs to bring a first action of infringement, and then again bring a second action to ask for the fine. The EU does not even meet these minimum criteria. Assuming that the EU has its permanent population and defined territory, and even assum- If we make the criteria of a "state" more substantive, i, e., requiring a government to be autonomous, the EU at present or under the Constitutional Treaty would not satisfy that requirement. As I have discussed above, the EU is established by the states through the principle of conferral of power (Art. I-11(2)) , and the Union competence does not cover every matter that a state can cover. In short, the EU has no . It is important to remember that the system is given legally protected independence from the other EU and national decision-making processes (Arts. I-30 (3), III-188) . The entire task of European monetary policy is separated from national control and from normal EU political control. This regime has also been given effective legal rights to defend its own power and status (e. g., Art. III-365 (3)), and the necessary legal rights of its own to implement European monetary measures (Arts. 1-30 (4) (5), . Thus it normatively constitutes an independent system stem in the EU polity, in relation to the task of European Monetary Policy. In this way, a classic "state" is normatively dissected into specific "functions" at European level, and re-organised along these functions without corresponding to any specific final polity model of the Union. Looking this from a national perspective, it is possible to observe that the adoption of the early warning procedure at the Union level is in effect a Europeanisation of such national best practice as was originally developed in Denmark (Hagel & Rasmussen 1985) . Therefore the early warning procedure is seen not only a self-prophesy on the part of the Union legal order, but also a self-prophesy on the part of the national legal orders that is shared in advance before their separate national amendments take place.
It is already an established practice for the Union to adopt certain national best practices in building the Union's own governing system. The This Union-national legal interaction might gradually bring about a fundamental change of national constitutional paradigm as well. It is not inconceivable even in the UK, where there is no written Constitution.
Before and after the British accession to the EEC (1973), serious legal debate arose among constitutional lawyers in Britain (Nakamura 1993).
Traditionalists argued that the legal doctrine of "Parliamentary Sovereignty" remained intact after the UK's accession : they recognised the EEC as an international organisation with delegated powers (Cmnd. 3301 (1967) ; Cmnd. 6003 (1975) ). Based on this understanding the British Parliament reorganised its Parliamentary Committee to supervise the British government's behaviour in the Council in Brussels (Cygan 1998) . This is a typical paradigm of national constitution of Westminster-type government, that the Parliament shall control and supervise the executive (national administrative institution). It never assumed any European "legislative" role for the British Parliament in national legal terms. Interestingly, however, a minority argument at that time may now sound more real and thought-provoking in the present context, to the effect that the British Parliament had changed its "manner and form" in national legislation, i, e., it changed its own definition of "Parliament", originally composed in tripartite form (the Queen, the Lords and the Commons), but after the accession it transformed itself into quadripartite form (the three original entities plus Brussels!), to the extent EEC law applied (Winterton 1976 ).
This view suggested that the British Parliament should be involved in European legislation. If we take this view, we would be able to accommodate the "early warning procedure" in British legal terms without difficulty, whereas the traditional view may have difficulty in explaining why the delegated organ can organise its principal's own deliberation procedure and rights to vote. From the functional legal perspective, the autonomy of the Union legal order is now established after 50 years of practice, especially in those policy areas classified as "exclusive competence" of the Union. Thirdly, therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that the EU constitutional order comprises two normatively separate but interlinked legal orders : the national constitutional orders on the one hand, and the Constitutional Treaty order on the other hand. These two parts make up the EU constitutional order as a whole. The national legal order at present maintains classic sovereignty discourse in national and international law, whereas the Union legal order has developed its own discourse on its power that is inspired by comparative legal analysis of national laws and international law as well as its own didactic interpretation of positive law such as the Constitutional Treaty. Mainly by setting up the Unionnational law interface and promoting the interaction between the two legal orders, the Union power discourse may transform the classic national sovereignty concept firstly functionally, and then eventually formally as well.
So far the mixture of these discourses has not produced a fixed model of the EU polity, which at best is described in the negative form : not a state in international law, nor an international organization set up between the states. It is a unique entity of a non-state kind that contains an inherent system of legal interaction and concept transformation. In this ultimate sense, it would be rather meaningless to discuss whether the Constitutional Treaty is a "constitution" or a "treaty". It is neither of them, because the paradigm of judgment itself is being transformed by
48
The EU as a Plural Constitutional Order : An approach to the Constitutional Treaty (Nakamura) the system that the Constitutional Treaty establishes.
Conclusion
The EU at present, and under the Constitutional Treaty, is best seen as a plural constitutional order in normative terms as well as in practice .
The Constitutional Treaty is a partial constitution. It mainly represents the Union part of the whole EU constitutional order, and the national constitutions mainly represent the national parts. Both have , however, interlinking norms to recognise each other-to form a polity as a whole .
Since 6) However, some procedural differences in legislation for ex-third pillar matters remain.
7) The only exception is that in the field of CFSP, where adoption of European Laws and European Framework Laws is excluded (Art. 1-40(6)). The present paper argues that the EU is a new type of non-state polity in which the Member State constitutional order and the Union constitutional order compete as well as complement each other. The paper first categorises four main approaches to the EU polity analysis : State Sovereignty Approach, Super-State Approach, Functional State Approach and Non-State Polity Approach. Then the paper discusses various legal aspects of the Constitutional Treaty to analyse which of the four approach best captures the unique legal features of the EU as well as the political practices that have been taken so far. In brief, State Sovereignty Approach captures well the Member States' ultimate EU polity making power, but fails to recognize the on-going polity making by other fully entitled actors including the European Parliament. Super-State Approach does not correspond to the legal settings that the Constitutional Treaty stipulates, nor does it correspond to the political reality of current Europe : there seems no Member State or majority of Union citizen that want a European level nation-state. Functional State Approach, on the other hand, captures well the EU's functional similarity to a state. However that approach also faces the inconsistency between the legal provisions of the Constitutional Treaty and the functional reality : there is no formal suggestion or stipulation in the Constitutional Treaty that the EU would supersede the Member States to form a single state (with or without creating a "nation" at European level). In the end, therefore, the current 
